MEI paper repost: How to respond to a flawed election
posted: 03-12-2009 by: Martine van Bijlert
The Middle East Institute released its 'Viewpoints' special edition on Afghanistan yesterday. It contains 53 short essays by leading experts and practicioners on Afghanistan's recent history, including several AAN members. The paper below is a repost of Martine van Bijlert's contribution (without the footnotes).
Afghanistan’s
Second Presidential Vote; How to Respond to a Flawed Election
In the run-up to Afghanistan’s second presidential
election, voter enthusiasm was muted by the widespread perception that the
outcome would be determined not by votes, but by international decision-making,
political backroom deals and fraud. The events during and after polling only
confirmed this view: there was overwhelming fraud and manipulation, often
organised or facilitated by government and electoral officials; responses to
the crisis were crafted in behind-the-scenes negotiations between local
political leaders and powerful international actors; and in the end the winner
was declared based on a series of improvised procedures and decisions that were
ratified by statements of international approval.
The main international actors – the UN (UNAMA and
UNDP), US, European nations and NATO/ISAF – had been unprepared for the
unfolding crisis, despite warnings that the absence of independent institutions
had left the process wide open to manipulation and fraud. Embassies in Kabul,
who relied on briefings by electoral officials and the UN for their
information, sent their capitals reassuring reports about “fraud mitigating
measures” and assessments that possible “irregularities” would not
fundamentally undermine the credibility of the vote. The main concerns had been
about voter turnout and security – in particular after several high-profile
attacks highlighted the vulnerability of the process. So once the elections had
taken place and voters had voted, there was an overwhelming sense of relief and
achievement, as reflected in most early statements on the conduct of the
election.
Many Afghans however felt quite differently: rattled
by the many security incidents, including in areas that had been safe before,
and offended by the fraud and manipulation that many of them had personally
witnessed. As the international press caught on to the unprecedented scale of
the fraud, references to the courage of the voters and the achievement of a
fully Afghan-led process were no longer sufficient to suggest a credible vote.
The UN leadership and foreign diplomats were confronted with a dilemma that
would shape their actions and decisions: how to deal with flawed elections when
you desperately need them to be seen as credible and legitimate?
Most nations were faced with dwindling public support
and had tried to downplay the problems relating to the elections – and anything
else – as long as possible. A complicating factor was the narrative of the
increasing Afghan lead and how that would ultimately guarantee a smooth exit.
This made diplomats reluctant to engage more closely, even if this meant
leaving the process in the hands of blatantly partial institutions. So with the
UN SRSG in the lead they opted for a hands-off approach and insisted that “the
process run its course”. This resulted in a major confrontation between the two
main electoral bodies. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which was
not independent, removed several anti-fraud triggers from the counting process,
releasing well over a million suspicious votes – most of them for Karzai – into
the count, before announcing the results. In doing so, it not only ignored a
binding order by the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), but it also fatally
undermined the idea of a functioning Afghan process. And this is when the UN
stepped in.
Backed by the main international Ambassadors and
assisted by two electoral experts, who were hastily flown in, the UN SRSG embarked
on a highly complicated audit process aimed at restoring the perceived legality
of the process. The route was not obvious and the procedures chosen were
complicated and as a result in-transparent. This was illustrated by the
continuous confusion over its details and implications – even among those who
were regularly briefed. The “process” was precariously held together by the
consent of the two main presidential competitors (which had to be renegotiated
several times), the repeated expressions of support by a select group of
international Ambassadors, the assumed expertise of the UN advisers, and the
reluctant cooperation of the IEC – while the rest of the country waited.
The expectation of the main international actors that
ultimately Karzai would win meant that discussions were essentially about
whether it should be a first or a second round victory and how this could be
used to shape future relations. In the meantime negotiations in search of a
political settlement – which included only the two main competitors –
continued. This was closely followed and encouraged by international diplomats
who hoped that an Afghan-led solution, which could still be presented as legal,
would provide an alternative to going into an actual second round of voting.
The absence of a clear international focus, other than insisting on the
legality of the process and an Afghan lead, meant that the UN and its backers
became hostage to the political posturing of both candidates and was left with
no leverage over the IEC once the second round was announced. At the same time
international envoys were seen to be heavily involved in intense negotiations
with the two candidates. Great political capital was spent in persuading Karzai
to accept the second round – and praising him when he did – and then in
convincing Abdullah not to contest the outcome when the IEC, after his
pull-out, announced Karzai’s victory on 2 November 2009.
This focus by international actors on following a precarious – almost imaginary – process in order to insist to domestic audiences that “the system worked” was a high risk strategy. The intense involvement in a process that resulted in Karzai’s re-election signalled to Afghans that he is again the international community’s choice. It confirmed their suspicions that the electoral process – even if it is expanded to include complicated fraud investigations – is mainly an elaborate cover for decisions made elsewhere. And the failure to prepare for a flawed election – instead hoping that it would turn out to be “credible enough” – forced the international actors to step in without achieving actual leverage. This means they are again seen as “being in charge” without actually possessing the means to influence what happens.
The full report can be downloaded here.